Ebola outbreak response; experience and development of screening tools for viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) in a HIV center of excellence near to VHF epicentres. by Parkes-Ratanshi, Rosalind et al.
Ebola Outbreak Response; Experience and Development
of Screening Tools for Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF) in
a HIV Center of Excellence Near to VHF Epicentres
Rosalind Parkes-Ratanshi1*, Ali Elbireer1,2, Betty Mbambu1, Faridah Mayanja1, Alex Coutinho1,
Concepta Merry1,3,4
1 Infectious Diseases Institute, Makerere College of Health Sciences, Kampala, Uganda, 2 Johns Hopkins University, School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland, United States
of America, 3 Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, 4Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
Abstract
Introduction: There have been 3 outbreaks of viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) in Uganda in the last 2 years. VHF often starts
with non-specific symptoms prior to the onset of haemorrhagic signs. HIV clinics in VHF outbreak countries such as Uganda
see large numbers of patients with HIV 1/2 infection presenting with non-specific symptoms every day. Whilst there are
good screening tools for general health care facilities expecting VHF suspects, we were unable to find tools for use in HIV or
other non-acute clinics.
Methods: We designed tools to help with communication to staff, infection control and screening of HIV patients with non-
specific symptoms in a large HIV clinic during the outbreaks in Uganda. We describe our experiences in using these tools in
2 Ebola Virus Disease outbreaks in Uganda.
Results: During the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreaks, enhanced infection control and communication procedures were
implemented within 24 hours of the WHO/Ministry of Health announcement of the outbreaks. During course of these
outbreaks the clinic saw 12,544 patients with HIV 1/2 infection, of whom 3,713 attended without an appointment,
suggesting new symptoms. Of these 4 were considered at risk of EVD and seen with full infection procedures; 3 were sent
home after further investigation. One patient was referred to the National Referral Hospital VHF unit, but discharged on the
same day. One additional VHF suspect was identified outside of a VHF outbreak; he was transferred to the National Referral
Hospital and placed in isolation within 2 hours of arriving at the HIV clinic.
Discussion: Use of simple screening tools can be helpful in managing large numbers of symptomatic patients attending for
routine and non-routine medical care (including HIV care) within a country experiencing a VHF outbreak, and can raise
medical staff awareness of VHF outside of the epidemics.
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Introduction
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) refer to a group of illnesses
that are caused by viruses of diverse families, including Lassa fever,
Rift Valley Fever, marburg viruses, and ebola viruses [1,2]. VHF’s
characteristically lead to overall vascular system damage and often
accompanied by hemorrhage (bleeding). VHF have high case
fatality rate (between 25–100% [3]) and spread easily (in an
outbreak in Zaire up 25% of cases were health care workers [4]).
Providing care to VHF suspects without adequate infection control
processes can cause extreme anxiety [5]. Exposure to VHF
patients often results in health care workers being quarantined,
which can be frightening and unpleasant [6]. VHF outbreaks
provoke widespread national and international interest, often with
dramatic media reporting [7]. Therefore, health care workers in
VHF areas are usually very aware of health professional fatalities
in previous outbreaks, through both media reports and peer to
peer communication [8,9]. Therefore providing medical care in
any setting near to a VHF outbreak is stressful for health care
workers [10–12]. Consequently, managing this anxiety and stress
in health care workers, whilst continuing to provide a compre-
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hensive service is essential in maintaining an effective health care
service during a VHF outbreak.
The initial symptoms and signs of VHF are often non-specific,
including fever, rash and vomiting, prior to emergence of a more
haemorrhagic pattern [13–16]. In Sub-Saharan African countries,
where there is a high burden of infectious disease, non-specific
symptoms are commonly seen in many patients without VHF
attending health care facilities, especially in those presenting with
malaria [17,18] and complications of HIV [19]. This means that
during a VHF outbreak there are many people attending health
care facilities near to the epicenter who may have similar
symptoms to those with VHF, but who are not exposed or
infected. In Uganda there are about 438,000 people who regularly
access care and treatment for HIV1/2 infection, and many of
them attend clinic every month [20]. Therefore, up to 20,000
patients attend for HIV 1/2 related care every day across the
country. Missed appointments and especially HIV drug treatment
interruptions may adversely affect the health of HIV infected
patients. Health centres distant from a VHF epicenter in Angola
saw reduced attendance of patients for other causes during the
VHF outbreak [21], suggesting that patients also suffer from
anxiety during VHF outbreaks and have been found to exhibit
altered health seeking behaviours. Ensuring that patients attend
for their HIV appointments is vital for good HIV care and
treatment, and therefore reassurance to patients during a VHF
outbreak is another priority for maintaining good clinical services.
In 2012 Uganda experienced 3 separate outbreaks of viral
haemorrhagic fever; two Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreaks
[22] and one Marburg Virus Disease (MVD) outbreak. The Adult
Infectious Disease clinic (AIDC) at the Infectious Diseases Institute
(IDI) in Kampala sees up to 500 patients with HIV 1/2 infection
per day. During the recent VHF outbreaks in Uganda it was
essential to protect and reassure both the health care workers and
patients as much as possible, whilst maintaining routine clinical
services for all patients. However, whilst good tools were available
for VHF treatment centres [1,23], we were unable to find any
readily available tools or literature that would assist us to deal with
a large and often symptomatic HIV clinic population during a
VHF outbreak. Therefore, the IDI team developed 3 tools; an
action plan for staff and management, a screening tool for
symptomatic patients, and a laboratory information leaflet to assist
guide and assist health care workers to continue routine clinic
activities as safely as possible. In this article we present these tools
and our experience with using them.
Methods
The Adult Infectious Disease Clinic (AIDC) at the Infectious
Diseases Institute is located within the Mulago National Referral
Hospital Complex, Kampala. Between July –September 2012
there were 9925 patients infected with HIV 1/2 registered at the
clinic and there were an average of 465 patients seen per day.
Patients are seen on appointment (scheduled) or if they are unwell
(unscheduled). Between 29th July and 4th October 2012 in Kibale
District Western Uganda and 17th November and 30th November
2012 in Luweero District, Central Uganda, there were 2 outbreaks
of EVD virus. Between 22nd October and 23rd November 2012
there was a MVD outbreak in South West Uganda. The AIDC
clinic is located approximately 206 km, 64 km and 404 km miles
respectively from these 3 VHF outbreaks (figure 1). 41% of the
AIDC patients live outside of Kampala, and many travel from
across the country for their HIV care in the AIDC clinic. During
each VHF outbreak both suspected and confirmed VHF patients
travelled to Kampala and sought care at the National Referral
Hospital and from other health care providers. Therefore, there
was a credible risk of VHF suspects attending for care at the
AIDC.
As details of the first outbreak emerged, the clinic management
team looked for tools which we could use for information and
patient screening in our clinic. The CDC/WHO Infection
Control document for VHF in African settings was used as a
reference, but this was not specific for an HIV out-patient setting
[23]. Therefore we produced and distributed our own tools on 30th
July 2012. The first tool (figure 2) was an action plan developed to
establish the process of our response to the epidemic, and was
circulated to all staff and IDI senior management, along with the
CDC Ebola leaflet for background information[24]. As per the
action plan, we met to discuss with situation with all staff, and to
give them concise and scientific information on the virus.
During each outbreak we identified an infection control nurse to
be stationed at the clinic entrance. Her role was to perform triage
of patients and to encourage standard infection control procedures
such as hand-washing. She was responsible for ensuring that there
were adequate hand washing facilities and supplies. All staff and
patients were requested to wash their hands before and after
entering the clinic. At entrances where soap and water were not
available, alcohol gel was used. All staff were reminded to wash
hands or use alcohol gel in between patients. The infection control
nurse also gave twice daily health talks to patients in the waiting
area, and answered questions related to VHF. This nurse also
performed a basic triage of unwell patients with respect to
haemorrhagic symptoms, and discussed all potential cases with a
senior staff member before they were allowed to enter the main
clinical unit. Any VHF suspects were directly referred to the
National Referral Hospital Ebola unit and not admitted to the
AIDC clinic. These activities were continued until Ministry of
Health announcements stating the end of the outbreak.
Symptomatic patients are seen and managed in a designated
‘urgent care’ area of the clinic. This is an isolated area, where
patients can be seen and can wait apart from other patients.
During the VHF outbreaks the staff working in this area were
provided with additional protective clothing. All clinic doctors
were provided with screening tool (figure 3) for use for all patients
who had attended for an unscheduled visit, and any patients with
scheduled appointments who reported symptoms suggestive of
VHF not identified by the infection control nurse. The tool was
reproduced and made available in all clinical rooms. The tool was
mainly based on symptoms, and included a points system, where 2
or more symptoms or any sign, or one symptom in a patient
having been to an outbreak area highlighted the patient as a
possible VHF suspect. These were then discussed with a senior
doctor for advice on referral to the VHF unit at the National
Hospital. Cardinal signs of haemorrhagic necessitated an imme-
diate referral to the National Hospital. A senior doctor visits the
urgent care team frequently to provide support and advice, and
this support was increased during the outbreaks. For this study we
have reviewed the screening tools filled and the urgent care
admissions list to find those considered to be possible VHF
suspects during the study period.
The internationally accredited IDI Core laboratory processes an
average of 600 samples a day from over 40 sites around the
country. The third tool was an information leaflet distributed to all
lab staff and to all staff who were taking and dealing with blood
and other samples (Figure 4).
Staff taking blood samples and working in the lab received
sensitization on how to take samples, to manage samples and to
dispose of samples in a safe manner.
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Ethical considerations
This process was approved by the Institutional Review Board.
The study and use of data was reviewed and approved by the
Scientific Review Board of the Infectious Diseases Institute, the
Institutional Review Board of Makerere University and the
Uganda National Council of Science and Technology. Individual
written patient consent was waived by these ethical and review
committees since data was collected for routine clinical care and
unique identifiers are removed for operational research purposes.
Results
Outbreak 1 – Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak, Kibale (29th
July 2012 to 4th October 2012)
We developed the first draft of the tools within 24 hours of the
WHO and Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) announcements.
The action plan was initiated and the screening tool was first
distributed to staff on 30th July 2012. The screening tool was then
refined and re-circulated on 31st July 2012. Over the 67 days of
this outbreak, we saw 9458 patients in the clinic and of these 3077
were unscheduled appointments. The laboratory processed about
38,000 samples. The AIDC clinical team identified 2 possible
suspects. Case 1 was female patient identified by the infection
control nurse. She reported to the infection control nurse with a
history of haematuria and diarrhea. She had not travelled to the
VHF epicenter area and had not cared for patients from that area.
The patient was seen in the urgent care isolation zone, with barrier
nursing. Detailed further history revealed dysuria and diarrhea.
She was afebrile and urine analysis was normal. She received
ciprofloxacin and paracetamol and was discharged home. Case 2
was a female patient with fecal blood who had not been identified
by the infection control nurse or the doctor, but reported bloody
diarrhea to a counsellor, in the clinic. The counselor requested she
see a doctor but the patient absconded from the clinic. She was
contacted by telephone by a clinic doctor later that day and gave a
3 month history of altered bowel habit, with some per rectal
bleeding, not consistent with an acute infection. This was worse
after taking her ART. She had not travelled to the epicenter area
and had not cared for patients from that area. VHF was ruled out
on clinical history and was encouraged to come back for further
investigations of her chronic problem. Case 3 had fever, headache,
abdominal pain, and an itchy skin rash. She was afebrile, and she
was treated for a non-specific rash with prurigo. She was treated
with cetirizine, hydrocortisone cream and magnesium suspension
for gastritis. She was discharged home that day.
Outbreak 2 - Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreak,
Luweero (17th November and 30th November 2012)
We instigated the process 24 hours before the WHO and MoH
announcements (due to information received from Mulago
Hospital) and an updated screening form were circulated to staff
on 16th November 2012 (figure 2 shows the response times in this
outbreak). Over the 13 days of this outbreak we saw 3086 patients
with HIV 1/2 infection in the clinic, and 636 had unscheduled
appointments. The lab processed about 7,200 samples. We
identified one possible suspect (case 4) who had a rash, fever,
and diarrhea and was from Luweero district. This patient was
Figure 1. Map of VHF outbreaks in Uganda July 2012–June 2013.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100333.g001
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given metronidazole and ciprofloxacin and transferred to the VHF
unit at Mulago Hospital. Full infection control procedures were
followed by staff handling the patient, and in handling laboratory
samples. The patient was discharged from the VHF unit later in
the day with no definite diagnosis. Laboratory samples were
disposed of as per the protocol. Staff received counseling, but were
not quarantined as they had no direct contact with body fluids.
During the second outbreak we were contacted by another HIV
service provider and research clinic working within the Mulago
Hospital Complex, who requested our tools for use in their clinic.
Outbreak 3 - Marburg Virus Disease Outbreak, South
West Uganda (22nd October-23rd November 2012)
The process was not fully implemented as there were no
reported suspects reaching Kampala, and the outbreak was mainly
confined to the South West of Uganda.
Figure 2. Plan for infection control at AIDC in case of major or potentially severe communicable disease outbreaks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100333.g002
Figure 3. Form for assessment in urgent care for haemorrhagic fevers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100333.g003
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Figure 4. Laboratory Information –Ebola.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100333.g004
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Post outbreak experiences (1st December 2012–1st July
2013)
During the 6 months following the outbreaks in Uganda, 10306
patients visited IDI (6032 unscheduled appointments). Clinic staff
identified one VHF suspect (case 5) outside of a known outbreak in
mid-2013. The patient presented with headache, fever, and
diarrhea. He had epistaxis, hematemesis and bloody diarrhea. On
examination he had hyperemic conjunctiva. He was found to have
a thrombocytopenia with a platelet count of 1146103/uL. This
patient was admitted to the National Referral Hospital within
2 hours of being seen in the clinic. The patient was isolated on the
ward, and hospital staff treated the patient as VHF suspect. Senior
clinic staff were notified immediately. No staff member was
exposed to patient fluids. Urgent communication to lab staff
ensured that blood samples taken by staff were handled safely. The
MOH national VHF response team was notified and he was tested
by the MOH team for VHF within 24 hours of admission. The
case was VHF serology negative. No definite diagnosis was found.
(Table 1 summarizes clinical information on all suspects seen)
Discussion
The VHF outbreaks in Uganda have caused a considerable
amount of anxiety for both patients and staff in our large HIV
clinic. In order to manage this anxiety and reduce the risk of
occupational exposure in our clinic while providing an uninter-
rupted service we have designed and implemented easy to use tools
in our clinic for use in VHF outbreaks. The action plan enabled us
to communicate with staff within the clinic and in outreach
projects around the country, as quickly and early as possible, in
order to provide valuable information and to reduce anxiety. In
both outbreaks we managed to communicate important informa-
tion to staff within 48 hours of the announcements.
The use of an objective point based screened tool enabled us to
continue to see a high number of HIV patients, often with vague
symptoms, in a safe and effective manner in an out-patient HIV
clinic which was not a VHF receiving centre. Our main objective
was to provide a sensitive tool for identifying possible VHF
suspects within a population of patients with HIV in order to refer
them to a designated VHF clinic. Therefore, our tool was
purposefully less specific than the WHO screening tools to be used
in VHF centres, for instance, whilst we asked about symptoms, the
questions we asked about exposure were limited to being in the
geographical area, and did not go into details about contact with
patients/attendance at burials etc. This did increase the number of
‘‘possible’’ suspects that were highlighted to a senior doctor, but
our experience was that this was manageable number and that it
was important to have a more sensitive tool that could be a
primary screening, prior to more intensive screening by the VHF
receiving centre.
The lessons learnt from the development of these tools included
that having access to tools to follow also helped to reduce stress of
the staff, as they were able to perform their normal duties with
reassurance that not every patient they encountered might have
VHF. During the second outbreak we were able to update the
existing screening form very quickly and our response was more
rapid and coordinated. Additionally the use of these tools has
sensitized our staff on the symptoms and signs of VHF, and how to
identify a possible suspect quickly. This was highlighted by the
identification and rapid management of a possible suspect outside
of a known outbreak. Whilst the IDI laboratory employs universal
precautions at all times, management of suspected VHF samples
requires a higher level of caution. The laboratory document
enabled laboratory staff to understand what additional precautions
they needed to take, and consequently to reduce anxiety by
providing a procedure for management of samples.
Whilst our tool is ‘‘ideal’’ for our clinical environment, it does
have to be adapted to each outbreak. What is ‘‘ideal’’ for us may
not work in other clinics with different models of care e.g. nurse
led services, services without an ‘‘urgent care’’ area. Perhaps the
WHO or local Ministries of Health in countries at risk of outbreak
could consider making these tools or adapted versions of these
tools available for other out-patient clinic settings with high patient
loads. Whilst our experience suggests that the action plan and the
screening tools are easily understandable to staff, we did find that
with multiple experiences we became quicker at implementing our
response. Therefore, we think that health facilities may consider
simple training programme or staff sensitization prior to an
outbreak, which might also help health care workers to become
familiar with the tools and to implement them quickly if an
outbreak occurs.
Conclusions
We believe that these tools/response aids may serve an unmet
need in countries which suffer relatively frequent VHF outbreaks
Table 1. Summary of VHF suspect characteristics.
Patient
Age and
Sex Cd4 count ART regimen Symptoms
Possible
exposure Outcome
Case 1 46, F 592 (21%) TDF/3TC/LPR-RIT Dysuria, haematuria,
diarrhea. No fever
Nil known Treated for bacterial gastro-enteritis/UTI as
outpatient with Ciprofloxacin
Case 2 42, F 196 (8%) AZT/3TC/Nevirapine Abdominal pain and
diarrhoea after taking
drugs
Nil known Drug side effect – monitored as out patient
Case 3 35, F 492 (23%) AZT/3Tc/Nevirapine Headache, Abdominal
pain, Rash
Nil known PPE and gastritis – treated with cetirizine,
hydrocortisone and magnesium suspension
Case 4 42, M 139 (13%) TDF/3TC/EFV Fever, joint pain, sore
throat, diarrhoea
From district
containing
epicentre
(Luweero)
Given treatment for bacterial gastroenteritis
with ciprofloxacin/metronidazole. Transferred to
National Referral Hospital VHF unit for
investigation but discharged
Case -5 35,M 237 (17%) Nil Fever, headache,
bloody diarrhoea,
epistaxis, heamatemasis
Outside of known
outbreak
Transferred to National Referral Hospital VHF
unit
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100333.t001
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and have a high HIV prevalence. We would encourage other HIV
clinics or clinics with a high turnover of patients, who work in
areas of potential VHF outbreaks to consider a risk management
strategy, with readily available and objective assessment tools,
which can be activated quickly during a similar emergence
outbreak situation.
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